Chinese movements and social controls by Mui, Michelle S.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2006-06
Chinese movements and social controls
Mui, Michelle S.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2815










Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 








 Thesis Advisor:   Anna Simons 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-
0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per 
response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering 
and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, 
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate 
for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) 
Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2006 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:   
   Chinese Movements and Social Controls 
6. AUTHOR Michelle S. Mui 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not 
reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
     A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore and analyze the threat posed by certain social 
movements during the post-Mao reform era and the various methods of social control used 
by the Chinese government to deal with them.  The thesis will use historical data and 
three case studies to examine the influence and popularity of social movements and 
methods of control, from surveillance to physical intimidation to imprisonment and 
forced exile.  The thesis will also explore the evolution of social control over the 
decades of social change in China.  What characteristics of a social movement threaten 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)?  Does the CCP have a preferred method of social 
control, and has that method withstood the test of time?  Does the increasing number of 
protests signify that China is losing control over its population?  What does the 
future hold?  
 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
77 
14. SUBJECT TERMS   
China, Social Movements, Social Controls, Tiananmen Square, China 
Democracy Party, Falun Gong 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
CHINESE MOVEMENTS AND SOCIAL CONTROLS 
 
Michelle S. Mui 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1999 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 











Author: Michelle S. Mui 
 
 































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore and analyze 
the threat posed by certain social movements during the 
post-Mao reform era and the various methods of social 
control used by the Chinese government to deal with them.  
The thesis will use historical data and three case studies 
to examine the influence and popularity of social movements 
and methods of control, from surveillance to physical 
intimidation to imprisonment and forced exile.  The thesis 
will also explore the evolution of social control over the 
decades of social change in China.  What characteristics of 
a social movement threaten the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP)?  Does the CCP have a preferred method of social 
control, and has that method withstood the test of time?  
Does the increasing number of protests signify that China 
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The early Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintained 
effective control over its population.  But in recent 
years, this control seems to have waned as protests and 
demonstrations continue to grow in size and occurrence.  
Public protests, once rare in Communist China, are becoming 
anything but, numbering in the tens of thousands each year.  
And the growing numbers of protests are also growing in 
size and organization.  The statistics are staggering, with 
police claiming a nationwide increase of 268 percent from 
1993 to 1999 and a similar trend in 2000 and 2001.1  
Surprisingly, the central government’s responses have 
been relatively mild, engaging in limited dialogue and 
compromise with individuals or isolated groups or leaving 
local authorities to deal with the issues.  However, 
several exceptions do stand out, when the central 
government not only took action, but elicited widespread 
criticism from the international community for cracking 
down so harshly on the offending parties.  Three movements 
which evoked a central government response are the 
Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989, the China Democracy 
Movement of 1998, and the quasi-religious sect of Falun 
Gong. 
Since the death of Mao Zedong and the debacle of the 
Cultural Revolution, the pro-reform element within the 
central government has slowly gained more influence, and 
                     1 Murray Scot Tanner, “China Rethinks Unrest,” The Washington 
Quarterly, 27.3 (2004): 137-138; available from 
http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/journals/washington_quarterly
/v027/27.3tanner.html; accessed 7 February 2006. 
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has sought to change Chinese society through economic and 
political reforms.  But when the government is itself 
directly threatened, it tends to revert to the more 
traditional methods of social control characteristic of Mao 
and police states. 
The purpose of this thesis is two-fold.  The first 
objective is to examine instances when the Chinese 
government has reverted to traditionally aggressive methods 
of social control to pacify certain elements of the 
population, and to determine why those instances warranted 
such action.  Did the three case studies mentioned above 
pose a particular threat to the CCP, and if so why?  What 
was it about these movements that attracted the 
government’s attention?  The second objective of this 
thesis is to examine the actual methods of social control 
exercised by the CCP.  What have been the methods of 
choice, have those methods of social control changed or 
evolved over time, and how effective have they been against 
dissident elements of society?  Effectiveness should be 
characterized by how quickly and decisively the government 
reacted to each movement and if these movements retained 
any influence after the crackdowns. 
B. BACKGROUND 
When Mao Zedong assumed power and established the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949, the government 
exercised authoritarian rule over its population.  During 
the first several decades, with the Kuomintang Nationalists 
safely ensconced in Taiwan, the Communist Party suffered 
little resistance from its citizens.  Even Chairman Mao 
Zedong’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution did not 
elicit much resistance despite large death tolls and 
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widespread famine.  How was the Party able to maintain such 
tight control?  What elements of control did it exert?   
The Chinese Communist Party assumed complete control 
of all media in the country and used media to promote Mao 
and the Party while the Nationalists, Japan, and Taiwan 
were vilified.  In the late 1950s Mao allowed citizens to 
express their opinions about how the government should be 
run, but he quickly reconsidered his decision when the 
liberal and intellectual thinkers of China began voicing 
opposition to and criticism of the CCP, leading to the 
persecution of approximately 500,000 citizens. 
The early communist government relied heavily on 
propaganda and physical persuasion to exert control over 
the populace.  Secret police and surveillance kept the 
citizenry in line, as did the numerous detentions, purges, 
and forced confessions of intellectuals and political 
challengers to Mao and Party policy.  Collectivization of 
land for redistribution to peasants also helped to retain 
the support of the majority.  But as China began to grow 
economically, the government could no longer shelter the 
population from external ideas or influence.  Following the 
travesty of the Cultural Revolution, Mao fell from power.  
More moderate views took hold and a period of reformation 
began. 
The 1970’s ushered in a new era, or at least a new 
regime, with Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power.  In 1978 Deng 
led a series of economic and political reforms which 
gradually implemented a market economy and some political 
liberalization that relaxed the system set up by Mao.  It 
was during Deng’s administration that the first real 
organized protests began to take place.   
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The Beijing Spring of 1977 and 1978 marked a brief 
period of political liberalization, during which the public 
had unusual freedom to criticize the government.  This is 
also when the Chinese democracy movement sprang forth.  
Although Wei Jingsheng, the author of the movement’s 
founding document, the Fifth Modernization, was imprisoned 
for fifteen years, his ideas continued to gain in 
popularity and spread among the college educated citizens 
concerned about growing corruption and economic 
dislocation.  By the 1980’s the Chinese people were 
starting to visibly chafe under the Communist regime.  The 
intellectuals were dissatisfied with the level of social 
and political reforms, while inflation and unemployment 
threatened the workers.  The urban population began 
questioning the government, protesting against corruption 
and calling for more social and political reform. 
Although student demonstrations took place in 1985 and 
1986, it wasn’t until June 4, 1989, that these 
demonstrations captured international attention.  Students 
and workers, highly influenced by the democratic movement, 
marched in Beijing.  They occupied Tiananmen Square and 
began a hunger strike to protest China's economic 
instability and political corruption.  But what began as 
peaceful student demonstrations, ended in bloodshed.  After 
the declaration of martial law failed to resolve the 
conflict, the government ordered the use of military force, 
which effectively quashed the protest, but sparked the 
overseas formation of numerous pro-democracy organizations 
by Chinese student activists. 
Following Tiananmen, the China Democracy Party (CDP) 
attempted to gain official recognition as an opposition 
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party to the CCP in 1998.  Seemingly tolerated at first, 
the CDP soon found itself the target of a severe crackdown.  
It did not survive long.  The democratic movement began its 
decline in the 1990s due to repressive measures by the 
Chinese government, including strict controls over the 
media and internet in mentioning democracy.  Additionally 
the September 11 attacks on the United States allowed China 
to pass a number of anti-terrorist measures, which further 
expanded its authority to prosecute suspected potential 
dissent. 
Most recently the quasi-religious sect of Falun Gong 
gained popularity among a large portion of the population 
who turned to it for spiritual guidance and health 
benefits.  Once an officially recognized organization, it 
was outlawed after followers staged a peaceful 
demonstration to protest increasing government restrictions 
over its activities. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis is a case study 
approach based on library research and analysis.  The case 
study chapters will all be structured similarly to provide 
a uniform method of description and analysis.   
The first case study will present an historical 
overview of Tiananmen Square, including some background and 
a description of the events leading up to the bloodshed of 
June 4, 1989.  The discussions of the repercussions of the 
crackdown will be followed by an analysis of the 
government’s actions and methods of control used during the 
crisis.   
The second case study will examine the China Democracy 
Movement.  Though small in size and influence, the central 
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government still chose to take definitive action against 
the CDM.  This chapter will provide background on the 
movement’s origin and members, followed by a description of 
the events leading up to the government’s response to the 
Movement’s quest for recognition, and the consequences to 
both sides.  The analysis portion will concentrate on the 
government’s actions and their effectiveness. 
The third case study will focus on the quasi-religious 
sect of Falun Gong, a practice once recognized and followed 
by millions before being vilified almost overnight.   
Background will be offered on the origin of qi gong and why 
Falun Gong was so popular.  Description of the government’s 
change in perception and its actions will be followed by an 
account and analysis of the social control methods used.  
The concluding chapter will pull together the analyses 
from the preceding three case studies in order to compare 
and contrast their similarities and differences and 
determine why these movements posed such a threat to the 
Party.  It will examine the methods of control used against 
each movement to determine their effectiveness and whether 
the Chinese government changed, evolved, or modified its 
methods over time. 
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II. TIANANMEN SQUARE CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstration was arguably 
the most significant demonstration in the history of 
Communist rule in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  
What began as a commemoration for a fallen leader and a 
call for social change and political reform quickly 
escalated through peaceful demonstration and hunger strikes 
to martial law, violence, and death.  Tiananmen was 
significant not only because of its size and scope, but 
also thanks to media coverage and its resulting effects on 
the Chinese government.  Hundreds of thousands of students, 
workers, and local residents participated in the 
demonstrations, symbolizing a significant campaign against 
authority.  What events inspired such widespread support, 
why did the government react the way it did, and why did 
the demonstration fail? 
B. BACKGROUND 
Tiananmen Square is culturally significant for its 
location and as a historical landmark.  It is a large plaza 
near the center of Beijing, measuring some 90 acres, making 
it the largest open-urban square in the world.  In it 
stands the massive monument to China’s revolutionary 
martyrs along with Mao Zedong’s mausoleum. 
Initially, Tiananmen Square was a symbolic, 
ritualistic, and bureaucratic space, but as the surrounding 
areas became China’s political and educational center, the 
square slowly came to be a natural forum for rallies and 
political debates.  The Department of Justice and 
Parliament were located on the west side while numerous 
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colleges and universities were clustered around the square, 
including the three main campus units of Beijing 
University, women’s colleges, and the prestigious Qinghua 
College where students developed their English-language 
skills before commencing study in the United States.2 
The first major demonstration in Tiananmen Square 
occurred in 1917 when students and townspeople gathered in 
the square to celebrate the failed attempt to restore 
Emperor Puyi to power.  On May 4, 1919, three thousand 
student representatives from thirteen area universities and 
colleges protested the Treaty of Versailles, which granted 
several German concessions in China to Japan.  The protests 
of the May Fourth Movement ushered in a new phase of 
nationalism and firmly established Tiananmen Square as a 
political focal point.  It became a site for massive 
demonstrations in 1925 when 100,000 gathered in a sympathy 
rally for forty plus Chinese demonstrators killed by 
British police.  On October 1, 1949, Mao used the site to 
declare the founding of the People’s Republic of China, 
establishing it as the Communist government’s preeminent 
public space.  Although the government tried to maintain 
control of the square by relocating most of the colleges 
and universities, the public still demonstrated its access 
to the area with the spontaneous mourning assembly for 
Premier Zhou Enlai in 1976 and the Democracy Wall Movement 
of 1978-1979.3 
In 1978 Deng Xiaoping, the new leader of Communist 
China, included a series of economic and reforms which 
gradually yielded a market economy, as well as some                      2 Jonathan D. Spence, Chinese Roundabout (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1992), 298. 
3 Ibid., 298-303. 
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political liberalization that relaxed the system set up by 
Mao.4  While the economic reforms mainly benefited the rural 
population, they left most of the country’s intellectuals 
and urban industrial workers dissatisfied.  By the 1980’s 
this latter faction of the Chinese population began to 
chafe under the Communist regime.  The intellectuals were 
dissatisfied with the level of social and political 
reforms, while inflation and unemployment threatened the 
workers.  Even the urban population began questioning the 
government and started to protest against corruption.  
Despite the Chinese government’s implementation of a number 
of economic reforms which helped the farmers and peasants, 
its continued reluctance toward greater social and 
political reform distressed millions. 
Early student demonstrations took place in Tiananmen 
in December 1986.  Although the students disbanded 
peacefully the following month, then-Party General 
Secretary Hu Yaobang was criticized for his weak leadership 
in combating ideological deterioration and was forced to 
resign from his post.  However, students continued to 
regard him as a symbol of liberal reform and clean 
government.5 
Throughout the late 1980s, the population continued to 
protest China's economic instability and political 
corruption.  In 1988 Deng implemented a number of 
                     4 This sentence and following paragraph draws on Jeffrey T. Richelson 
and Michael L. Evans, “Tiananmen Square, 1989 The Declassified 
History,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 16, 1 
June 1999; available from 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/; accessed 1 December 
2005. 
5 Zhang Liang, The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership’s 
Decision to Use Force Against Their Own People – In Their Own Words 
(Public Affairs: New York, 2001), 19. 
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deflationary measures, which created hardships among the 
urban residents and rural migrants.  Additionally, the 
population had grown increasingly weary of government 
corruption. 
This period was also characterized by conflicting 
sentiments among party leaders who were divided on the 
issue of economic reform.  Zhao Ziyang, then-Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and Deng Xiaoping’s 
appointed successor, represented the “reformers” whereas 
Premier Li Peng represented the “conservatives.”6  Zhao 
Ziyang led the moderate faction in the Party and was more 
sympathetic to the students’ cause.  He would later 
advocate talks with the students while Li was to consider 
the students a threat to the Chinese government and 
advocated quick and decisive actions to suppress them. 
The decline of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 
further complicated matters.  The Chinese leadership 
watched nervously as communist regimes toppled, later 
culminating in the bloody end of Ceausescu’s reign.  
Chinese leaders panicked at this development, particularly 
when faced with the rise of civil protests within their own 
borders. 
As the events in Tiananmen began to evolve, the pro-
reform liberals slowly lost ground to the conservatives in 
choosing a method of response.  Other events such as Soviet 
leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing and the 
seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement further 
aggravated an already precarious situation. 
 
                     6 Alan P. Liu, “Aspects of Beijing’s Crisis Management: The Tiananmen 
Square Demonstration,” Asian Survey, Vol. 30, No. 5. (May 1990), 507. 
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C. EVENTS 
On April 15, 1989, the death of Hu Yaobang, the 
popular former general secretary, provided students with an 
opportunity to voice their dissatisfaction with the pace of 
political change.  They launched spontaneous mourning 
activities that spread rapidly and alarmed conservative 
Party leaders that pro-democratic elements would attempt to 
play on students’ emotions to their own benefit.7 
The student movement initially began with a desire to 
commemorate Hu, praising his contributions to the Party and 
voicing the need for political reform and opposition to 
corruption.  However, small minorities among the 
demonstrators seized the opportunity to criticize the Party 
and certain leaders, demand freedom of press and speech, 
and call for democratic elections and greater government 
transparency.  Slogans that were previously limited to 
school campuses found their way to Tiananmen Square.8 
Government leaders were divided in their assessment of 
the movement’s threat.  While Party General Secretary Zhao 
Ziyang recommended patience and open dialogue with the 
students, Premier Li Peng towed the conservative line and 
regarded the demonstrations as a potential threat to Party 
stability.9  After government officials refused to receive 
student petitioners at the Great Hall of the People on 
April 18, several students staged a sit-in in front of 
Zhongnanhai’s Xinhua Gate.10  On the evening of April 19, 
student demonstrators attempted to break through police 
                     7 Zhang, 27. 
8 Ibid., 19. 
9 Ibid., 26-27. 
10 Zhongnanhai complex serves as the Party’s central government 
headquarters, and Xinhua Gate is the southern entrance to the compound.   
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lines.  The following morning, the Beijing government 
declared temporary martial law in order to bus the students 
back to their campuses.  More than one hundred students 
refused to cooperate and clashed with police.11  A number of 
autonomous student organizations formed virtually overnight 
on April 20-21, further hardening the views of the 
conservative Party leaders.12 
The movement, while concentrated in Beijing, was by no 
means limited to Beijing.  Other major cities also reported 
demonstrations, but with a broader social base of 
participants and more radical slogans.13  Initially the 
demonstrators in Beijing consisted mostly of university 
students and some intellectuals.  Other Beijing citizens 
were slower to join in the demonstrations.  Demonstrations 
in the outlying provinces were quicker to unite and involve 
other social groups.  While the masses in Beijing applauded 
the students, the crowds in outlying provinces marched with 
the students.  Thus, these demonstrations consisted of 
students, workers, officials, and residents whose concerns 
were not limited to Hu’s death.  The issues they were 
protesting also included inflation, salaries, and housing 
problems.14 
Believing that the demonstrations would dissipate 
following Hu’s memorial service, Zhao Ziyang continued to 
advocate patience.  He did not believe that the 
demonstrators were challenging the ultimate leadership of 
the Communist Party, but instead calling for dialogue and 
                     11 Zhang, 30-31. 
12 Ibid., xxxv, 19, 31-38, 45-48. 
13 Ibid., 44-45. 
14 Ibid., 44. 
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for the Party itself to address and solve the problems they 
raised.  Prior to departing for his scheduled visit to 
North Korea15, Zhao left Li Peng in charge with three basic 
instructions: firmly prevent the students from returning to 
the streets and demonstrating after the funeral, avoid 
bloodshed at all costs while legally prosecuting vandals, 
and exercise a policy of persuasion through dialogue.16  
However as a precaution, Central Military Commission (CMC) 
Chairman Deng Xiaoping dispatched approximately nine 
thousand soldiers to reinforce the police in maintaining 
order in the capital and to escort Hu Yaobang’s hearse to 
the cemetery.17 
When the students did not disperse as expected, but 
instead continued their boycott of classes, Li told Deng 
Xiaoping that the students wanted to overthrow the 
government.  He believed hostile elements were manipulating 
the situation and feared they would soon network with the 
workers and farmers to gain their support.18  Alarmed by 
this assessment, Deng labeled the movement “turmoil” and 
decisively denounced it.  His remarks were published in an 
April 26 editorial of the People’s Daily.19 
The harsh editorial further invigorated the movement, 
which now gained support from citizens and not just 
students, who felt the editorial was an exaggeration and an 
                     15 The Tiananmen Papers cite a conversation between Zhao Ziyang and 
Tian Jiyun, one of Zhao’s most trusted friends and lieutenants, which 
implies that the state visit had been previously scheduled and that 
Zhao made a conscious decision not to postpone it.  However, it is more 
commonly believed that the visit was actually scheduled at the last 
minute in order to get Zhang out of the country. 
16 Zhang, 50. 
17 Ibid., 47. 
18 Ibid., 46, 48, 56. 
19 Ibid., xxxvi. 
14 
overreaction.  The students saw themselves as patriots and 
protested in an effort to have the assessment rescinded.  
Government leaders first tried to win back public support 
through public statements and organizational work via 
administrators, professors, and officials; however, 
government support among these individuals began wavering 
as well.  On April 26, the Party organized mass 
demonstrations in which over ten thousand cadre were to 
infiltrate the student protesters and counter any inciting 
words or actions.  Regular troops were also stationed in 
the streets around the Square to further signify the 
government’s resolve.20 
The April 27 student demonstrations that broke out in 
response to the editorial were the largest in Beijing since 
the protests began.  Even cities without previous 
demonstrations reported them.  In response, Deng Xiaoping 
authorized the deployment of five hundred troops into 
Beijing to protect the Great Hall of the People and to 
serve as a reserve force if needed.21 
Although reporters interviewed students throughout the 
movement, government censorship of state-controlled media 
kept most stories out of Chinese newspapers.  As a result, 
students stopped talking to Chinese reporters and turned 
instead to foreign journalists. 
Unable to suppress the demonstrations and quell the 
reaction to the April 26 editorial, Li Peng assigned Yuan 
Mu, State Council spokesman, to conduct a dialogue with the 
students.  In this discussion Yuan promoted the Party line, 
denied problems of corruption and censorship, cautioned the 
                     20 Liu, 513. 
21 Zhang, 81. 
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Beijing demonstrators against being manipulated by 
counterrevolutionary elements, and evaded student 
questions.  His performance was not well received, and 
students took to the streets and campuses again in 
protest.22 
When Zhao Ziyang returned from his trip to North Korea 
on April 30, he faced a much-deteriorated situation 
compared to when he left.  He clashed with Li Peng over 
their assessment of the situation and the actions taken.  
Zhao believed that revising the April 26 editorial and 
addressing the students’ legitimate concerns would 
ameliorate the situation.  Li argued that Deng’s words 
could not be recalled and that order must be restored 
before further reforms could be considered.23 
However, all Party leaders wanted control 
reestablished by May 4 in order to avoid further turmoil 
during the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth 
Movement.  Intellectuals expected the anniversary to 
provide an opportunity for advocates to promote political 
reform and democratization.24  Beijing was also scheduled to 
host an internationally significant meeting of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) on that day.  On May 2 Peking 
University students presented a petition listing twelve 
demands for a series of dialogues.  In response Yuan Mu 
held a press conference on May 3 rejecting the students’ 
twelve demands, further inciting the students who, in turn, 
                     22 Zhang, 95-96. 
23 Ibid., 100, 117-118. 
24 The May Fourth Movement originated in 1919 and is viewed as the 
high point of Chinese liberalism and the start of the Chinese Communist 
Revolution. 
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voted to continue demonstrations on May 4.25  Tens of 
thousands of students from fifty-one campuses marched on 
the Square with drums, banners, and slogans, issuing a “May 
Fourth Declaration.”  The declaration called for the 
government to accelerate political and economic reform, 
guarantee constitutional freedom, fight corruption, adopt a 
press law, and allow privately run newspapers.26  A number 
of Beijing journalists also joined the students.  Prompted 
by recent censorship and the closing of the World Economic 
Herald in Shanghai, some two hundred reporters and editors 
joined the demonstrators and circulated a petition 
demanding dialogue with central leaders to discuss freedom 
of the press.27 
After the second week of demonstrations, the students 
grew frustrated with the lack of government action in 
response to their demands, and began a hunger strike on May 
13 that garnered international attention and worldwide 
sympathy.  The announcement of the hunger strike and 
Gorbachev’s imminent visit scheduled for May 15 worried and 
incensed Party leaders.  The hunger strike reinvigorated 
protests, attracting larger numbers from broader social 
groups, garnering nearly unanimous support among students, 
workers, farmers, staff members of government ministries 
and banks, and even some military officers and police 
cadets.28 
After the diplomatic humiliation of Gorbachev’s visit, 
the Politburo Standing Committee, consisting of Li Peng, Hu 
                     25 Zhang, 109. 
26 Ibid., 113. 
27 Ibid., 112, 114. 
28 Ibid., 175. 
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Qili, Qiao Shi, Yao Yilin, and Zhao Ziyang, met at Deng 
Xiaoping’s home to discuss its next course of action.  Zhao 
still favored accepting the students’ demand to change the 
verdict of the April 26 editorial and label the 
demonstrations as patriotic not turmoil, but he was unable 
to convince Deng.  The conservatives felt that any further 
concessions to the students would doom the Party and lead 
to anarchy.  Deng opposed Zhao and directed the Standing 
Committee to declare martial law in the capital on May 16 
despite Zhao’s objections. 
Unable to rescind Deng’s April 26 editorial statement 
about the student demonstration or forestall the 
declaration of martial law, Zhao accepted his defeat and 
attempted to resign in protest but was rebuffed.  Because 
Zhao had also attempted to convince the students in the 
Square to end their hunger strike and demonstrations to no 
avail,29 the Party used him as a scapegoat, blaming his soft 
approach and moderate responses for allowing the situation 
to escalate out of control.  Li accused him of 
individualism, undermining Party unity, and supporting the 
demonstrators.  Exhausted and discouraged, Zhao withdrew 
from the decision-making process until he was officially 
replaced by Jiang Zemin, whose hard-line tactics and 
earlier purge of the World Economic Herald in Shanghai 
caught the attention of Party members seeking to promote 
stricter conservative measures.  Zhao was stripped of all 
party posts and placed under virtual house arrest.  His 
staff and supporters met with similar ends.  
                     29 Michael S. Chase, “Communists Behaving Badly,” SAIS Review 21.2 
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Troops from twenty-two divisions attempted to move 
into Beijing on May 20, but were initially turned back by 
residents who were sympathetic to the students and had 
blocked the streets.  Opposition to martial law was 
widespread.  First day reactions from provincial polls 
showed over 80 percent of the population disapproved.30  
There was even an incident of an army commander refusing to 
carry out his orders.31  Additionally, thousands of overseas 
Chinese throughout North America and Europe rallied to 
support the student demonstrators and denounce the 
government’s decision to implement martial law.32 
On June 2, the remaining members of the Standing 
Committee finalized their decision to clear the Square by 
force and ordered troops to begin moving toward the city 
center.  As plain clothed and uniformed soldiers entered 
the city, they were met with anger and violence.  
Demonstrators and supporters set up blockades, surrounded 
pockets of soldiers, and threw rocks, bricks, and Molotov 
cocktails.  The central government labeled these actions as 
“counterrevolutionary rebellion” and ordered the Square 
cleared.  During the crackdown, several fights broke out, 
resulting in casualties among both soldiers and civilians.  
The Chinese Red Cross reported a final death toll of 
approximately 2,600.33 
D. AFTERWARDS 
Following the government’s actions at Tiananmen, the 
various organizations quickly dissolved as the Party began                      30 Zhang, 234. 
31 Ibid., 239. 
32 Ibid., 252, 266. 
33 Todd Crowell, “The Many Truths of Tiananmen,” Asia Times Online, 8 
June 2004; available from 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FF08Ad07.html; accessed 1 June 2006. 
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a purge of liberals from its ranks, targeting specific 
areas and organizations supportive of the demonstrations, 
and some 4 million party members for investigation.  The 
goal was to ferret out any hostile, anti-party, and corrupt 
elements or those with liberal tendencies.  Party members 
were required to reapply for membership after proving their 
support of the government’s actions or risk expulsion from 
the Party. 34  Those who could escape found refuge in 
foreign lands while many who were left behind denied any 
involvement in the demonstrations.  Many were arrested and 
forced to sign confessions.  The martial law troops, the 
People’s Armed Police, and the Municipal Public Security 
Bureau arrested 468 “counterrevolutionary rioters” by June 
10, seven of whom were sentenced to death.  By June 20, the 
number arrested rose to 831 and again to 1103 by June 30.35  
Some (mostly those safe overseas) continued the fight while 
others accepted the government’s victory and, given its 
decisive defeat over the protesters, viewed it as 
legitimate again.  Members of the press who had been 
involved in the demonstrations, had aided in the “extra” 
unauthorized newspaper publication, or had even appeared 
critical of the Party’s actions were fired or investigated. 
Few party leaders were willing to acknowledge publicly 
that frustration with rampant official corruption and the 
desire for greater popular participation in politics were 
among the root causes of the protests. Instead, they 
claimed that a cabal of domestic and foreign plotters bent 
on destabilizing China and overthrowing the CCP was 
                     34 James A. R. Miles, The Legacy of Tiananmen: China In Disarray (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 27-28. 
35 Zhang, 447. 
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manipulating the students.36  Even to this day, the 
Communist Party maintains that the demonstrations were a 
“counterrevolutionary rebellion” which was properly 
handled.37 
The events of Tiananmen Square unfolded under the 
watchful eyes of the worldwide press.  Following these 
events, the PRC fell came under significant international 
criticism as a result of its actions.  Numerous overseas 
Chinese marched on embassies to protest the bloodshed, 
while foreign government leaders similarly expressed their 
shock and outrage.  The harsh suppression of the protesters 
caused widespread condemnation by the United States and 
other Western powers and led to U.S. sanctions, suspension 
of high-level contacts, and a halt in the transfer of 
military technology.38  Other nations followed suit in 
instituting sanctions, suspending financial aid, and 
canceling travel to China.  
Yet despite huge costs, China’s leaders labeled the 
pro-democracy movement a counterrevolutionary rebellion and 
continue to firmly defend their decision to implement 
martial law, claiming that their harsh actions forestalled 
chaos and civil war.  
E. ANALYSIS 
The pro-democracy movement in the spring of 1989 
vented deep social dissatisfactions as economic and 
industrial reforms led to inflation and corruption.  As a 
result, the population began questioning China’s leaders, 
political system, and direction.  Government leaders were 
                     36 Chase, 226. 
37 Ibid., 230. 
38 Richelson. 
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divided about how to react, and whether to favor political 
liberalization or ideological tightening.  Those who 
opposed political liberalization feared that weakening 
Party control would encourage ideological and social 
disorder. 
Even before the demonstrations, the Chinese Communist 
Party leaders were split in their politics and views about 
economic reform.  Subsequent student protests, the May 4 
anniversary, Gorbachev’s visit, and international news 
coverage created further fracturing.  Tiananmen Square 
exposed this rift in the Party between conservatives, who 
viewed the demonstrations as turmoil, and reformers, who 
believed the demonstrations were essentially patriotic and 
in line with their own vision of gradual political reform.  
One side saw the need to maintain “stability” while the 
other side saw the folly in crushing the “banner of 
democracy.”39  In the end, the hard-liners won out, with 
Li’s view of the actions as a "naked declaration of war 
against the Party" and his assessment of the pro-democracy 
movement as a "well-planned plot" to undermine party 
authority.40 
Conservative government elements viewed the 
demonstrations as an organized counterrevolutionary 
rebellion with wide-reaching support from students, 
intellectuals, workers, and farmers.  Indeed, groups of 
liberal intellectuals did come out in support of the 
students’ goals, and the students themselves came from a 
number of provinces throughout China, but with this 
diversity the movement lacked central organization.  
                     39 Chase, 228. 
40 Ibid., 227. 
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Reports from some cities also indicated linkups between 
students and workers.41  These ties, along with the apparent 
fervor of the demonstrators, greatly concerned Party 
leaders. 
The Communist government has been responsible for many 
tragic events in the country’s history: from the violence 
of land reform to the 30 million deaths of the Great Leap 
Forward to the purges of the Cultural Revolution.  However, 
each time the government shifted the blame to others, 
whether to evil landlords, the weather, capitalists, 
counterrevolutionary revisionists, or even ghosts and 
spirits.  In contrast, Tiananmen could not be blamed on the 
“enemies of the people” because it was a movement of the 
people.  For the first time, the Party could not easily 
shift the blame and responsibility for the resulting 
violence and bloodshed.42  But this did not stop it from 
trying. 
The events in Tiananmen concerned Party leaders 
because of its threat to Party rule.  Tiananmen Square’s 
location in the Chinese capital of Beijing and its history 
as the central place for protests made it impossible to 
ignore.  Additionally the protestors attracted much 
support, both internationally and domestically, from a 
broad social base.  Nor did Tiananmen supporters represent 
isolated groups, but instead illustrated the government’s 
lack of control over the growing number of autonomous and  
 
 
                     41 Zhang, xxxviii. 
42 Anne F. Thurston, “Memory and Mourning: China Ten Years After 
Tiananmen,” SAIS Review 19.2 Johns Hopkins University Press (1999): 78-
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illegal student organizations.  Conservatives lived in fear 
of “turmoil” that might lead to another Cultural 
Revolution. 
Crowds numbering into the millions occupied the 
Square, blocking traffic, and disturbing everyday civil and 
social functions.  But the numbers of protesters alone, 
though impressive, were not the main concern.  More 
distressing was the popularity of the movement across 
occupations, regions, and social strata. Supporters came 
out en masse to encourage the students and join in the 
demonstrations.  Reports at the time indicated that the 
students were also beginning to network with other 
provinces in an attempt to gain more support throughout 
China.   
Conservatives believed hostile elements were 
manipulating and inciting the demonstrators to criticize 
the Party, its leaders, and its policies.  Though most of 
the slogans were limited to calls for reform, some more 
radical slogans included criticism of top officials and the 
Communist party, calling for the resignation of key 
leaders.  The demonstrators’ growing popularity and 
boldness were enough on their own to challenge Party rule 
and threaten its leaders, but overseas pressure and 
international attention raised the stakes even further. 
Other factors further undermined the government’s 
authority.  Internal dissent within the Party contributed 
to the public’s view of a weak and divided government, 
while the international news media reported on the Party’s 
inability to resolve the unrest.  Foreign newspapers 
closely followed events and speculation over Chinese 
leadership and internal struggles.  “The Washington Post 
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commented that the ongoing political and social unrest was 
greatly diminishing China’s influence in international 
affairs.”43  The timing of Gorbachev’s visit and the ADB 
meeting further embarrassed the Party and provided added 
incentives toward harsh repression of the demonstrators.44 
Initially, the pro-reform members of government 
attempted to calm the protesters through persuasion and 
dialogue.  Monitors infiltrated the demonstrators and 
reported on the movement and student leaders while 
government leaders attempted to work through movement 
leaders to calm the situation.  The state-owned media 
services censored student interviews, and the central 
government attempted to control the influx of students from 
other provinces.  However, as time wore on without 
significant progress in their discussions with movement 
leaders, the conservatives consolidated their control and 
implemented more repressive measures.  A mere military 
presence escalated to martial law, and finally the forcible 
clearing of the Square.  The post-June 4 measures were 
equally repressive in nature.  Numerous arrests and 
interrogations took place, requiring party members to 
reapply for membership and reaffirm their loyalty to the 
CCP. 
Tiananmen greatly impacted Chinese foreign and 
domestic policy.  Ironically, in 1992, after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the demonstrators’ demands for faster 
economic reform were realized with Deng’s economic reform  
 
 
                     43 Zhang, 305. 
44 Liu, 517. 
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campaign.  The diplomatic isolation that resulted from 
Tiananmen prompted China to seek a new accommodation with 
the West.45 
In sum, the government was slow and indecisive in its 
initial reaction.  This can be contributed primarily to the 
internal turmoil between the conservative and reformist 
factions within the Party, which led to contradictory and 
conflicting actions.  The lack of a clear course of action 
allowed the student movement to gain momentum in the face 
of the government’s weakness whereby the situation ended up 
escalating beyond peacefully controllable means. 
Just as the central government was ineffective in its 
initial response, it was similarly ineffective in its 
subsequent actions to quash the student movement.  Although 
the demonstrations themselves were broken up and the 
students eventually returned to classes, it was only 
through bloodshed that this occurred.  Despite the numerous 
detentions and arrests, the students and other dissidents 
did not remain silent for long.  As the pro-reform movement 
regained traction, dissidents who were released from prison 
embarked on a new movement toward social reform in the form 
of the China Democracy Party. 
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III. CHINA DEMOCRACY PARTY CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The China Democracy Party was a little known 
organization that attempted to establish itself as a 
political opposition party to the ruling Communist Party in 
the People’s Republic of China in 1998.  The group could 
barely sustain 200 active members and never even received 
official recognition as a social or political group.  Yet, 
the governing authority of China’s ruling Communist Party 
waged an impressive campaign against it, crushing the group 
in less than two years.  The significance of this movement 
rested not in its popularity, but in the symbolic threat it 
posed.  But what kind of threat could such a pitiful 
organization possibly pose to the multi-million member 
Chinese Communist Party, and how?  
B. BACKGROUND 
Under the term “multiparty cooperation,” the CCP 
officially permits the existence of eight political parties 
beyond itself: The Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese 
Kuomintang, the China Democratic League, the China 
Democratic National Construction Association, the China 
Association for Promoting Democracy, the Chinese Peasants' 
and Workers' Democratic Party, the Party for Public 
Interests, the September 3 Society, and the Taiwan 
Democratic Self-Government League.  However, all have sworn 
allegiance to the leadership of the CCP and play more of an 
advisory role than one of opposition.46 
                     46 “Nipped in the Bud: The Suppression of the China Democracy Party,” 
Human Rights Watch. September 2000, Vol. 12, No. 5; available from 
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Although most Party leaders, such as Li Peng asserted 
that China would never adopt a western-style multiparty 
system,47 many individuals and groups have attempted to 
establish political parties independent of the CCP.  None 
of these, however, has ever sought legal recognition or a 
national base.  None has boasted more than a few dozen 
members.  And none has survived.48  In 1987, a Chinese 
People’s Democratic Party (CPDP) was established in Fujian 
Province with approximately thirty-seven members.  Seven of 
its organizers were imprisoned after the CPDP criticized 
the 1989 crackdown of Tiananmen.  In 1994, sixteen 
dissidents belonging to the Liberal Democratic Party of 
China and the Free Labor Union of China were sentenced to 
heavy jail terms on charges of “organizing a 
counterrevolutionary group.”49  
Chinese dissidents in the 1990s began to combine 
direct challenges to the regime with the adoption of 
populist causes, such as workers’ rights, anticorruption, 
and environmental protection, in order to gain public 
sympathy.  Direct challenges came in the form of 
individuals declaring their candidacy in local elections 
and attempting to register dissident groups.  One such 
group was the China Democracy Party (CDP) which was founded 
in the summer of 1998.50 
C. EVENTS 
The PRC leadership began to worry about political 
activism during the 1990s with the revival of dissident                      47 Xinhua News Agency, 1 December 1998 in “Nipped in the Bud.” 
48 “Nipped in the Bud.” 
49 Ibid. 
50 Minxin Pei, “Rights and Resistance: The Changing Context of the 
Dissident Movement,” Chinese Society, 2nd Ed. (London: Routledge Curzon, 
2003), 31. 
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movements in a more relaxed political atmosphere.  Between 
September 1997 and mid-November 1998, Chinese officials 
loosened official control over intellectual debate and 
expression of political views.  It was during this time 
that many leading dissidents were released from prison due 
to internal political considerations and external 
pressures.51  The CDP first emerged as freed dissidents of 
Tiananmen Square and the Democracy Wall Movement of 1978-9 
began to reorganize.  Among them was Wang Youcai, a former 
student activist jailed for his involvement in the 1989 
pro-democracy movement, who discussed the idea of forming 
an opposition party with fellow dissidents in late 1997.  
The idea first occurred to him during his two-year 
imprisonment, but he took no action until well after his 
release. 
Chinese dissidents abroad also took an interest in the 
establishment of the CDP.  One such dissident living in the 
United States, Wang Bingzhang, even attempted to reenter 
China in order to form an opposition party and distribute 
manuals for pro-democracy activists.52 
The CDP was formally organized and issued a charter 
that explicitly called for an end to the “one-party 
dictatorship” of the Communist Party.  It also called for 
the promotion of human rights, justice, market reforms, and 
freedom of religion, and autonomy for ethnic minorities.53  
The CDP was to be based on the principles of “openness, 
peace, reason, and legality” with the intent to establish 
direct elections and a multi-party system.  The initial 
                     51 Pei, 28. 
52 “Nipped in the Bud.” 
53 Pei, 31. 
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strategy was to establish local preparatory committees, 
which would register under the CDP in order to gauge the 
response from local authorities and to pave the way for a 
national opposition party.  No formal procedures existed to 
allow new political parties to apply for legal status.  The 
CDP decided that applying through civil affairs was the 
closest approximation to legal application.  Therefore, 
preparatory committees would register with their local 
civil affairs bureaus, and once enough committees had been 
established, a national preparatory committee would be 
formed.54 
Early meetings of the CDP were held in secret, but on 
the eve of President Clinton’s visit to the PRC in June 
1998, Wang Youcai formally announced the founding of the 
China Democracy Party believing that the Chinese government 
would exercise restraint while Clinton was present.55  
Members of the Hangzhou Preparatory Committee signed the 
"Open Declaration of the Establishment of the CDP Zhejiang 
Preparatory Committee" on June 25 and publicly circulated 
the document over the internet.  They published a draft 
party constitution and requested the Zhejiang Province 
Civil Affairs Bureau to approve the party's application for 
formal legal status for the preparatory committee.  This 
was the first time dissidents attempted to register a 
committee that supported the formation of an opposition 
party in the PRC.56 
The “Open Declaration” blatantly criticized the CCP 
for not allowing opposition groups.   
                     54 “Nipped in the Bud.” 
55 Pei, 35. 
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The CDP forcefully condemns the behavior of 
ruling groups which suppress political opposition 
groups by force; forcefully condemns the 
application of methods such as torture and 
reform-through-labor against those who carry 
differing political views; and forcefully demands 
the authorities release all persons detained for 
differing political views.57 
 
Lacking secure communications and sufficient funds, 
the CDP encouraged dissidents nationwide to take up the 
cause and establish their own local preparatory committees.  
Wu Yilong, one of the founding members and author of its 
"Guidelines for Activities," embarked on a sixteen-day 
nationwide tour to spread the word.  Within four months, 
the CDP posted the names, phone numbers, and addresses of 
some 200 members on the internet58 and had secured broad and 
sympathetic international press in the United States and 
other democratic countries.59 
Shortly after President Clinton concluded his visit, 
the government took action.  It detained Wang and fourteen 
other dissidents on July 10.  Wang was officially arrested 
on August 7 and charged with "inciting to overthrow state 
political power,"60 but was released on August 31 under 
“residential surveillance.” 
Other preparatory committees attempted to register 
with the provincial Civil Affairs Bureau and were not 
immediately rejected.  Initially, they were all informed                      57 (Open Declaration of the Establishment of the CDP Zhejiang 
Preparatory Committee), published on June 25, 1998, translated by Jan 
van der Made in “Nipped in the Bud.” 
58 “Nipped in the Bud.” 
59 “Strains on China,” The Washington Post, 31 December 1999, A30. 
60 Li Wanfang, “Wang Youcai Under Residential Surveillance,” Beijing 
Spring, October 1998, 45 in “Nipped in the Bud.” 
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that the central government was considering the 
establishment of the CDP.  However, a Beijing official from 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs later held an international 
press conference to announce that provincial bureaus of 
civil affairs had no authority to permit the establishment 
of political parties.61 
On September 16, five well-known dissidents 
established the CDP Beijing Preparatory Committee and 
planned to register with the Beijing Civil Affairs Bureau 
on the 18th.  However, on the evening of the 16th, two of the 
signatories were detained and interrogated for several 
hours while the home of a third was ransacked.  Police 
later warned a fourth member to discontinue attempts to 
register the party.  Registration attempts in other 
provinces met with similar responses.62 
Up until September 1998, the central government had 
used stalling and intimidation techniques to discourage CDP 
members from establishing an opposition party.  However, 
the diehard members remained undeterred and, instead, 
continued to push for recognition, forcing the Party to 
deal more straightforwardly and harshly with these 
dissidents. 
Toward the end of 1998, the CCP had lost all patience 
with the CDP and began to suppress it in earnest.  On 
September 25, the "Regulations for Registration and 
Management of Social Groups" was signed into law.  The new 
regulations placed further restrictions on the formation of 
social organizations, including political ones.  
                     61 Central News Agency (Taiwan), 11 September 1998 in “Nipped in the 
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Unregistered group were labeled “illegal,” former political 
prisoners were banned for life from forming non-profit 
groups or holding office, and organizations seeking 
registration had to first meet strict financial 
requirements.63 
By November 2, Wang Youcai was back in detention, but 
other CDP members continued to execute their plans.  On 
November 6, Xu Wenli, a veteran of the 1979 Democracy Wall 
Movement, established the First CDP National Congress 
Preparatory Work Group and, on November 9, the CDP Beijing-
Tianjin Regional Party Branch was established with Xu as 
chairman.  The branch revised the party charter and called 
on dissidents in prison and in exile abroad to join in 
preparatory efforts to establish a more permanent core CDP 
leadership.64 
The move to establish party branches, in lieu of 
preparatory committees, without official recognition or 
permission from the central government indicated that the 
CDP viewed itself as a nationwide organization intent on 
forming a national structure.65  The CCP responded with 
three waves of arrests, interrogations, and trials which 
provoked an immediate response from dissidents who demanded 
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protest.  The U.S. State Department and several foreign 
ministers criticized the trials as contrary to the 
promotion of human rights.66 
Despite the first wave of arrests, a second echelon of 
leaders stepped forward.  The new CDP leaders continued to 
hold meetings and issue open letters to the government.  
Additional party branches formed, but did not seek to 
register with the civil affairs bureaus.  Gao Hongming, who 
had taken over leadership of the Beijing-Tianjin branch 
after Xu Wenli’s detention, announced the membership of the 
national committee on February 6, 1999 and made plans to 
hold a national congress in March.  But police intervened 
and the planned national congress never convened.67 
Police continued to harass CDP by breaking up 
meetings, routinely detaining and interrogating members, 
and ransacking their homes.  In March the CCP government 
issued another call to maintain social safety and to guard 
against “foreign hostile forces” aimed at destroying the 
Communist Party.68   
Despite government warnings to refrain from engaging 
in any activity detrimental to state security and social 
stability, the Beijing branch of the CDP called for a 
peaceful commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the 
Tiananmen Square massacre.  It asked people to wear light-
colored clothing and go to Tiananmen Square to “stand or 
sit still for a while” without posting posters, shouting 
                     66 Todd Crowell and David Hsieh, “China Gets Tough,” Asiaweek, 08 
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slogans, or interrupting construction work in the Square.69  
However, the unobtrusive protests still resulted in a 
second wave of detentions, indictments, and approximately 
200 arrests.70  The third and final wave of arrests and 
trials began on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China. 
The first wave of arrests resulted in the detention of 
at least seven prominent CDP members who were tried and 
sentenced to lengthy prison terms.  The second wave, 
sparked by the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade, the unexpected rise of Falun Gong, and the tenth 
anniversary of Tiananmen Square, led to the detention of 
190 individuals, including some CDP members.  The third 
wave of arrests between September 1999 and July 2000 
claimed another ten top CDP members and effectively 
silenced the organization’s activities.71 
D. AFTERWARD 
Despite the relatively small size of the China 
Democracy Party, the government crushed the organization 
through heavy harassment, and waves of detentions and 
arrests.  Over the eighteen-month crackdown, at least 34 
individuals were sentenced to prison terms of up to 
thirteen years, most on subversion charges of undermining 
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state power, and four others fled into exile abroad.  
Individuals were often detained repeatedly and interrogated 
or held without trial for extended periods.  Oftentimes 
wives were not informed of the charges against their 
husbands, how long they would be detained, or even where 
they were being held until trial was imminent.  Those key 
members who remain in China still live under constant 
surveillance and have ceased to be openly active.72 
By January 2000, the CDP had been effectively crushed.  
Activities all but ceased, and remaining publications and 
protests were issued and organized from abroad. 
E. ANALYSIS 
The China Democracy Party posed a direct and blatant 
challenge to the Chinese Communist Party.  It called for 
multiparty democracy in China and respect for human rights.  
Even though it recognized the rule of Communist Party 
leaders, it also openly criticized the same ruling body for 
denying opposition groups the right to exist.  Authorities 
regarded the CDP as a group that aimed to undermine the 
basic principles and the monopoly of power of the CCP.73 In 
several public addresses, President Jiang Zemin repeatedly 
emphasized that “stability should prevail over everything,” 
reiterating the need to protect social stability and to 
“nip in the bud” any developments which might threaten that 
stability.74  The CCP government clearly saw the demands of 
CDP activists as undermining the Communist Party's guiding 
principles.  




The CDP was not unique in its desire to establish an 
opposition party, but it distinguished itself from previous 
political opposition groups in its organizational designs 
and structure.  Previous groups had a relatively narrow 
geographic focus and little contact with foreign 
organizations, whereas the CDP promoted a nationwide 
network and possessed a sophisticated means of 
communication via the internet.  Furthermore, none of the 
previous organizations attempted to secure formal legal 
status, unlike the CDP.75 
Although the CDP consisted of a very small number of 
people, probably never more than 200 activists, most had a 
history of openly challenging official policy.  They were 
often veteran dissidents, many of them former political 
prisoners; 70 percent were active during the 1989 pro-
democracy movement, while a smaller subset, including many 
of the leaders, were active during the 1979 Democracy Wall 
Movement.  Members of the CDP were also skilled in modern 
communication techniques, especially via the internet, and 
strategic in their planning.76 
The size of the CDP may have been miniscule but its 
presence was far-reaching, with branches and preparatory 
committees represented in all but three of China's twenty-
seven provinces.  Communist party leaders also feared 
overseas support from exiled dissidents living abroad, as 
evidenced by calls to guard against hostile foreign 
forces.77 




After a short grace period and seeming tolerance, 
Chinese authorities responded to the CDP swiftly and 
decisively.  Communist Party leaders lost patience with the 
bold opposition group and decimated its ranks through 
intimidation and incarceration.  Key members were harassed, 
detained, interrogated, and imprisoned.  A new wave of 
arrests followed every “subversive action” by, or 
appearance of, new CDP leaders until their ranks were 
exhausted.  The cycle of trials and sentencing decimated 
the party within eighteen months. 
In sum, just as with the Tiananmen demonstrations, the 
CCP was again slow to react to this organization.  Between 
June 1998, when the organization formally announced its 
founding, and November, when the first wave of arrests and 
trials began, the CCP did little to decisively denounce the 
CDP.  Although intimidation techniques were used to 
discourage members, the central government took no specific 
measures to deny the establishment of preparatory 
committees until September.  The movement was small and its 
entire membership roster was posted online.  What is 
noteworthy is that it still took eighteen months and three 
waves of arrests to finally send such a small organization 
underground.  As founding members were arrested, new 
leaders took their place.  Even today, CDP supporters are 
still active overseas.  While the CCP was able to suppress 
the organization, it was not able to completely suppress 
its members. 
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IV. FALUN GONG CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Falung Gong, or Falun Dafa, movement inspired the 
largest and most protracted public demonstrations in China 
since the democracy movement in 1989.  Initially barely 
even a nuisance to government officials, practitioners of 
the “religious” sect quickly became a priority security 
issue after a peaceful sit-in in Beijing in April 1999.  
Fearing social unrest and political challenge, the Chinese 
government outlawed Falun Gong three months later and began 
the most brutal crackdown since Tiananmen, affecting not 
only Falun Gong but other similar organizations.  Despite 
the government’s efforts, Falun Gong followers continued 
staging small scale demonstrations for over two years, even 
interrupting government television broadcasts in 2002 and 
2003.78  What was the appeal of this religious sect, and how 
did an insignificant spiritual movement become such a 
serious threat to the CCP and political stability? 
B. BACKGROUND 
After the Communist government came to power in 1949, 
it created national religious organizations to confine and 
control the five recognized faiths: Buddhism, Daoism, 
Islam, Christianity, and Catholicism.  Residual local cults 
were suppressed as superstitious.  Thanks to the economic 
reforms of the 1980s, however, government control was 
weakened in many areas, including religion.  As a result, 
numerous churches, mosques, and monasteries reopened.  
However, the government still insisted religious activities 
be practiced only within the confines of the approved 
                     78 Thomas Lum, “China and ‘Falun Gong,’” CRS Report for Congress, 24 
January 2004, 1. 
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organizations established in the 1950s.  Other restrictions 
stipulated that believers devote their primary allegiance 
to Chinese religious leaders instead of foreign religious 
leaders, and that religious beliefs strictly adhere to 
socialist ideals.  This forbade any group from challenging 
the official creed of the state.79 
Falun Gong was derived from the practices and beliefs 
of qigong.  Qi describes vital energies or life forces.  
Qigong is the set of movements designed to stimulate the 
flow of qi throughout the body.80  Qigong quickly regained 
popularity and sects flourished in the 1980s and 1990s.  
They successfully combined post-socialist themes with pre-
revolutionary religious traditions.  They also provided 
educational and basic health care services to large numbers 
of Chinese citizens who were otherwise deprived of these 
due to the economic hardships of the time.81 
Li Hongzhi, a former Grain Bureau clerk, developed 
Falun Gong in the late 1980s.  In 1992, he explained his 
ideas in his book titled Zhuan Fahn, and from 1993 to 1996 
Falun Gong was incorporated into an official organization, 
the China Qi Gong Science Research Society.82  The Society 
later decided that Falun Gong was a Buddhist sect and 
deregistered it in February 1997.83 
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Falun Gong combined exercise, meditation, and moral 
guidance.  It preached the three main virtues of 
truthfulness, compassion, and forbearance and warned 
against materialism and moral degradation.  Followers 
believed that the practice of Falun Gong could lead to 
physical well-being, emotional tranquility, moral virtue, 
and cosmic understanding.84 
Practitioners claim to have no political agenda other 
than the protection of constitutional rights.  They also 
emphasize that Falun Gong is not a religion in that it does 
not worship any deity, consist of a formal hierarchy, 
church, or temple.85   
At the height of its popularity, Falun Gong claimed 
seventy million members in mainland China.86  Members of 
Falun Gong did not fit neatly into any specific 
demographic.  Every class and occupation of citizen was 
represented, from students and intellectuals, to farmers 
and industrial workers, and even government officials and 
party leaders.  Many retired military cadre and women 
believed the exercise regimen would improve their health.87  
Large numbers of adherents could also be found among the 
elderly and laid-off workers. 
C. EVENTS 
Falun Gong grew in popularity during the mid 1990’s, 
boasting several thousand followers in the United States 
and diverse millions in China, including many Chinese  
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Communist Party members.  The healing practices of the 
movement became increasingly attractive as economic reforms 
reduced medical benefits.88 
As Falun Gong grew in strength and power during the 
reform era, it attracted limited attention from the central 
leadership.  Following the June 1989 crackdown in 
Tiananmen, the PRC government imposed stringent new 
regulations on all social organizations.  Government 
surveillance increased and local governments established 
administrative offices to ensure compliance with the new 
policies.89 
In December 1990, the celebrated qigong master Zhang 
Xiangyu was arrested and charged with crimes ranging from 
the practice of qigong therapy without proper authority to 
organizing large public gatherings without prior approval 
of the Beijing police.  Her arrest and the subsequent 
closure of her Nature Qigong schools somewhat dampened, but 
by no means extinguished, the popularity of the practice.90 
Instead Falun Gong practitioners grew increasingly 
defiant in the face of government surveillance and 
suspicion.  Founder Li Hongzhi left China in 1996 and began 
promoting his qigong practices overseas.  Soon thereafter, 
the Chinese Society of Qigong Science and a Guangming Daily 
article accused Li’s Research Society of Falun Dafa of 
advocating superstition.  The Chinese Society of Qigong 
Science suspended his organization’s registration, and the 
Press and Publications Administration and several local 
governments banned his books.  Practitioners responded by 
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staging mass protests and sit-in demonstrations against 
media sources that criticized the group and its leader.91 
Despite growing numbers and popularity, the movement 
still remained largely unnoticed by the PRC government 
until April 1999.  Then, a popular science magazine 
published another article labeling Falun Gong as “sham 
qigong.”  Subsequent protests outside the magazine offices 
and the Tianjin municipal government led to a number of 
arrests.92   
Then most ominously for the government, on April 25, 
1999, over ten thousand Falun Gong activists gathered 
before Zhongnanhai to stage a peaceful sit-in to protest 
the government’s criticisms of the organization and growing 
restrictions on their activities.  Located near the center 
of Beijing, Zhongnanhai is the gated residential compound 
for the top Party leaders, representing the national 
headquarters of the Party and state.  Located just west of 
the Forbidden City, access to the complex was closed to the 
public following the 1989 Tianmanmen protest. Trespassers, 
not to mention demonstrators, were strictly prohibited.  
The ability of the Falun Gong practitioners to successfully 
organize and sustain a thirteen-hour protest93 without the 
Party’s prior knowledge greatly disturbed top leaders.94 
This gathering, the largest since the Tiananmen 
demonstration of June 4, caught Party officials completely 
by surprise.  The sit-in marked the group’s first public 
protest directed at central authorities.  The demonstrators                      91 Thornton, 259. 
92 Ibid., 259. 
93 Ibid., 260. 
94 James Tong, “Anatomy of Regime Supression in China,” Asian Survey, 
Vol 42, No 6 (Nov 2002): 819. 
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demanded official recognition and constitutional rights to 
free speech, press, and assembly.  Some evidence suggests 
that Party leaders disagreed as to whether or not to ban 
Falun Gong.95  However, President Jiang Zemin experienced no 
such conflict.  He was appalled by the disrespect shown to 
Party authority.  He was equally shocked at the 
mobilization capacity and discipline of the followers.  
Jiang denounced the demonstration as the “boldest public 
challenge to regime authority since the founding of the 
People’s Republic” and ordered a crackdown.96   
Just as they did with the Tiananmen Square 
demonstrators and the CDP, some Party officials suspected 
covert overseas involvement with Falun Gong.  The 
organization did indeed possess significant overseas ties, 
with both its leader and organizational headquarters 
located abroad.  Jiang particularly worried about American 
involvement, even going so far as to suspect the April 26 
demonstration of being part of a Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) scheme.97  He was also upset with the United 
States for granting Li Hongzhi a visa.  Additionally, Falun 
Gong boasted significant international support, with 
several thousand followers in the United States alone. 
Initial government reactions to Falun Gong included 
circulars prohibiting Party members from practicing Falun 
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infiltrated classes, and closed book stalls selling Falun 
Gong literature.98  But as tensions rose and demonstrations 
continued, the government tightened its control even more. 
Party leaders timed the more severe suppression 
efforts so as not to coincide with major events that could 
aggravate the situation or allow activists to take 
advantage of international press coverage, such as the 
anniversaries of the Tiananmen Massacre, Hong Kong’s 
reversion to Chinese rule, and the founding of the PRC.99 
After a three-month delay, Party leaders began an 
earnest crackdown.  On July 21, 1999, the PRC government 
outlawed Falun Gong.  Security officers closed teaching 
stations and practice sites and banned all publications 
concerning the movement.  Party and government officials 
were required to sever all ties to the Falun Gong movement.  
Additionally, Party cadre suspected of membership were 
required to confess, renounce their beliefs, and help 
undermine the sect.  Selected cadre were required to attend 
mandatory re-education in Party schools.  A public campaign 
was mounted to discredit the sect and its leader, while 
officials promoted alternatives to qigong meditation, such 
as other health-enhancing exercises.100  And, although 
safely overseas, a warrant was issued for Li Hongzhi’s 
arrest.   
By July 9, only a week after the sect was outlawed and 
Li’s arrest warrant was issued, the government effectively 
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shut down 28,000 practice sites and 80 websites,101 
confiscated 1.55 million publications, and detained over 
5,000 sect members.102  Between 150 and 450 sect leaders 
were sentenced to prison terms of 18-20 years on a variety 
of charges, including “leaking state secrets to foreigners, 
organizing superstitious sects, disrupting public order, 
obstructing justice, engaging in unlawful assembly and 
publication, tax evasion, and manslaughter.”103 
Within three months, the government detained and 
questioned over 30,000 participants, releasing them only 
after they denounced their membership through apostasy or 
identified other practitioners.104  The Communist Party 
organized and executed a program to arrest the sect’s top 
leaders, convert and rehabilitate over 300,000 Party 
members who renounced Falun Gong, and reeducate another two 
million practitioners.105  And in October 1999, the Standing 
Committee labeled Falun Gong an “evil cult”106 and issued an 
anti-cult law which legalized the repression of Falun Gong 
and similar organizations.107  
As Falun Gong followers continued traveling to Beijing 
to stage protests from July 1999 to October 2000, the 
central government began punishing provincial governments 
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for allowing practitioners to journey to the capital.  The 
provincial governments, in turn, delegated responsibility 
to local authorities who often employed brutal methods of 
suppression.108 
Following the harsh crackdown in the PRC, and with its 
leader residing safely abroad, Falun Gong organizational 
activities shifted to the internet, where practitioners 
could find elaborate websites, electronic bulletin boards, 
and e-mail distribution lists.  Overseas activists pursued 
high-profile activities, such as lobbying foreign 
governments and filing lawsuits.  Meanwhile, mainland 
practitioners established an underground network of cell-
like groups and shifted to web-based communication 
strategies.109 
As China entered the cyberworld, the Chinese 
government took several steps to control and monitor the 
internet, but Falun Gong’s leap into cyberspace forced 
Chinese authorities to increase internet surveillance.  
They launched a number of anti-Falun Gong websites and shut 
down an ever-growing list of banned sites.  Security agents 
routinely installed updated monitoring devices at the 
offices of internet service providers to track e-mail 
accounts and block websites.110 
D. AFTERWARDS 
The PRC government has repeatedly labeled Falun Gong 
“the most serious threat to stability in 50 years of 
[Chinese] communist history.”  The government feared that 
“religious fever” and economic unrest could spark 
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widespread political protests.111  But thus far the movement 
has shown little potential for rallying nationwide social 
support. 
The PRC government’s harsh crackdown on Falun Gong 
followers garnered some support for the movement.  However 
on January 23, 2001, the immolations of six individuals 
believed to be Falun Gong followers gave credence to 
government descriptions of a dangerous, superstitious cult 
and alienated many PRC citizens.  The PRC government took 
over two years to outwardly suppress Falun Gong, but 
followers are believed to still practice in secret.112  “The 
largest memberships and severest human rights abuses have 
been reported in China’s northeastern provinces, which are 
also experiencing high levels of unemployment.”113 
The Falun Gong movement continues to not only affect 
the Chinese government, but also to attract international 
attention, particularly because of human rights abuses and 
religious freedom violations. 
The United States House of Representatives passed 
House Congressional Resolution 188 on July 24, 2002, which 
called upon the PRC government to cease persecuting Falun 
Gong followers, and introduced House Congressional 
Resolution 304 on October 16, 2003, which called upon the 
PRC government to cease human rights violations against 
Falun Gong followers in China and to stop harassing 
followers in the United States.  For five years (1999- 
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2003), the U.S. State Department has categorized China as 
“a country of particular concern” because of religious 
freedom violations and persecution of Falun Gong.114 
E.  ANALYSIS 
The unexpected actions of Falun Gong practitioners in 
April 1999 surprised officials and awakened them to the 
potential of faith-based movements for inspiring loyalty.  
The concern of senior leaders about being caught off guard 
led to the severe crackdown of the organization and 
vigorous efforts to discredit it as a superstitious cult.115  
This resulted in thousands of arrests and sparked 
investigations into similar organizations. 
Religion can command a fanatic and loyal following in 
addition to being something individuals can turn to for 
guidance and meaning.  During a time of economic crisis, 
millions turned to Falun Gong for moral guidance and health 
benefits.  But the movement raised concerns over “cultural 
pollution,” thanks to which superstitious activities and 
beliefs could undermine officially approved values.116  
Falun Gong challenged the Party’s right to moral authority 
over its people.117 
In addition to its ability to promote an independent 
belief system that represented a direct challenge to the 
Party’s ideological authority, the government was also 
concerned over Falun Gong’s size and organizational 
capacity.118  
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At the height of its popularity, Falun Gong had a 
following of several millions.  Although the majority of 
practitioners were middle-aged citizens and women with 
little interest in politics or dislike for the government, 
it was also popular among retired cadre and military 
members and government officials.  Its influence flourished 
well outside formal control and offered its followers 
spiritual guidance far more appealing than anything the 
government could offer.119  Falun Gong attracted the 
attention and anxiety of Party leaders when they realized 
the organization was not limited to an isolated group of 
individuals, but one whose constituency spanned localities 
and socio-economic boundaries.120  
Falun Gong further demonstrated how easy it was for an 
organization outside the state to mobilize the masses 
without the government even being aware.  The ability to 
organize a major demonstration without prior knowledge of 
the Communist Party or the Public Security Bureau alarmed 
officials.  And the conduct of the demonstrators during and 
after the sit-in demonstrated strong organizational 
capacity and discipline.  Because the sect appealed to many 
former cadre, leaders worried about the level of 
infiltration by Falun Gong into the Communist Party, to 
include the military and civil service.  Hostility toward 
the sect grew as Party leaders were forced to acknowledge 
the number of cadre and senior officials who belonged to 
it.121  In addition to its large domestic following, Falun 
Gong also enjoyed significant overseas support. 
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In sum, the fervor with which the government cracked 
down on Falun Gong underlined how threatened Party leaders 
felt.  The organization was outlawed and labeled a 
superstitious cult.  Publications were banned, confiscated, 
and destroyed while practice sites were shut down.  
Officials waged an information operation campaign by 
attempting to discredit the organization and its leader and 
by increasing surveillance and censorship of the internet.  
But the most severe measures included the mass arrests and 
persecution of suspected individuals, forced confessions 
and reeducation, detention of tens of thousands, 
imprisonment of hundreds, and the expulsion of many more 
from jobs. 
Again, the CCP demonstrated a lapse in early threat 
recognition.  Although Falun Gong had millions of 
followers, the central government did not sense a potential 
threat until ten thousand followers surprised authorities 
with a well-organized sit-in demonstration.  The subsequent 
three-month delay in the crackdown can be attributed to 
concerns about timing, given various inauspicious 
anniversaries or the large number of cadre and Party 
members who belonged to the sect; however, the methods of 
crackdown were similar to those employed by the government 
in the previous two cases, with mass detentions and forced 
confessions.  But despite the Party’s greatest efforts 
Falun Gong is still quite active, with members practicing 
in secret, disrupting television broadcasts, and even 
engaging in immolations.  It seems no exaggeration to say 
that the crackdown of Falun Gong did little more than move 



























When comparing the three case studies, one finds that 
the rise of each movement was facilitated by the political 
liberalization and economic developments of the post-Mao 
reform era.  However, the actual origins of each movement 
differ somewhat.  The Tiananmen students were greatly 
influenced by the democracy movement, and their primary 
concerns were continued and accelerated economic and 
political reform.  The China Democracy Party had similar 
goals, as many of its key members were former student 
activists and intellectuals; however, its primary goal was 
to establish an opposition party under the premise of 
multi-party cooperation. Lastly, the Falun Gong emerged as 
a spiritual movement, whose primary complaint was about 
increasing restrictions of its activities.   
None of these groups presented themselves as a very 
violent opposition or intent on overthrowing the 
government.  In fact, all the organizations attempted to 
achieve their goals through peaceful and legal means in 
conjunction with the ruling Communist Party.  The students 
in Tiananmen staged peaceful sit-ins and hunger strikes and 
sought dialogue with Party leaders.  The CDP patiently 
submitted request after request for formal recognition.  
Falun Gong practitioners were perhaps the most die hard 
with a handful engaging in self-immolations, but those 
occurred only after a harsh crackdown.  Indeed, it was a 
peaceful sit-in that sparked the Party’s interest in Falun 
Gong.  None of these groups, then, posed a militant threat 
to the government. 
54 
However, in terms of sheer numbers, both the Tiananmen 
students and Falun Gong practitioners could rally large 
groups, involving millions and attracting the support of 
millions more.  The CDP’s size was almost negligible 
compared to these other organizations.  With only some 200 
members, the CDP could hardly be considered a significant 
opposition force, yet the central government reacted just 
as strongly to it as against the other two groups. 
B. THE THREAT 
In a sentence, the Party regarded each movement as a 
serious threat to its existence and authority.  These 
organizations could rally popular support and they also 
demonstrated impressive organization capabilities.  All of 
them rallied inter-societal support and engaged in 
networking, thus suggesting that dissident groups were not 
isolated, but interconnected.  Workers, students, and 
farmers from multiple provinces were proving capable of 
being organized and intertwined.  The central government 
also feared possible foreign support as each group 
possessed overseas ties. 
Internal, domestic crises invariably pose a threat to 
regime legitimacy.  The conflicts are often over principle 
and have a symbolic aspect, making compromise more 
difficult.  Recognition of a new interest group may serve 
as a sort of contagion, forcing a restructuring of the 
political system.122 
The government also feared independent organizations.  
The Party believed that as soon as it gave in to any demand 
                     122 Liu, 506. 
55 
from an organization it did not control, the Party’s 
monopoly over power would be destroyed.123 
Chinese leaders are perfectly aware of the dangers 
inherent in cross-class, cross-nationality, and cross-
regional associations that challenge their authority.  
Because of such fears that protests could give rise to 
inter-class, inter-regional, or even international 
connections, the government often tries to deal with 
attempts to establish such bonds swiftly and severely, 
often through repressive measures.124 
The leadership and organizational capacity of 
dissident groups in these three cases particularly 
concerned Party leaders.  Many key members of the CDP were 
former political activists with strong agendas, and the 
Falun Gong consisted of numerous retired military and cadre 
with exceptional organizational skills.  The Tiananmen 
Square protests, though not centrally organized, did spring 
forth from a number of autonomous student organizations 
outside formal control, and the unexpected April 1999 Falun 
Gong sit-in demonstrated the sect’s ability to mobilize 
large numbers without alerting any authorities. 
Most importantly, each group posed a threat to the 
Communist Party’s leadership simply by challenging the 
Party’s overarching authority over economic, political, and 
spiritual matters.  The China Democracy Party challenged 
the CCP’s right to political monopoly while Falun Gong 
challenged CCP’s right to moral authority.  The CCP  
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emphasized stability above all, so was bound to view any 
dissident activity as challenging the social stability of 
the country.   
C. SOCIAL CONTROL METHODS 
The methods of social control the government applied 
varied slightly for each movement but, for the most part, 
followed the same general pattern.  Tiananmen began with 
some dialogue in an effort to diffuse the situation, but 
even this preliminary dialogue can be described as 
insincere.  Zhao may have wanted to engage the students in 
meaningful dialogue, but the representatives sent by the 
Party either did not offer concessions or were low-level 
cadre who could not offer concessions.  When conservative 
elements gained control, even this evaporated into physical 
intimidation.  Surveillance techniques were used to monitor 
student activities and identify ring leaders.  Even from 
the outset of the demonstrations, the government 
infiltrated the students and generated almost hourly 
situation reports.  Party members also received daily 
reports from the outlying provinces.  When it became 
apparent that the demonstrators would not disperse, force 
was used.  Subsequent to the demonstration, suspects were 
detained en masse, interrogated, and forced to sign 
confessions or denounce any participation in the 
demonstration or support for the demonstrators. 
The CDP was seemingly tolerated at first, but as soon 
as it proved its resolve, key members were firmly advised 
to give up their fight.  Again, individuals were carefully 




intimidation to slowly decimate their ranks.  CDP members 
were detained, interrogated, searched, and imprisoned under 
charges of subversion.   
Falun Gong members were also subject to similar 
physical intimidation techniques.  Initially Party members 
were told to sever ties with the movement, but once the 
Party outlawed Falun Gong, practice facilities and book 
stalls were closed, publications were confiscated, and web 
sites shut down.  A purge of practitioners began as 
thousands were detained and questioned.  Leaders were 
imprisoned, and cadre were forced to renounce the practice 
and undergo reeducation training.  An arrest warrant was 
issued for Li Hongzhi, Falun Gong’s leader, while the 
government embarked on an information campaign to discredit 
Li and the sect. 
All these events elicited a similar response from the 
central government.  Initially it gave the impression of 
dialogue and tolerance, but as soon as the organizations 
grew beyond the Party’s control, more forceful and physical 
controls were implemented, specifically detentions, 
interrogations, and imprisonment.  Detained individuals 
were either forced to renounce their involvement in 
dissident activity or they were made to confess and assist 
in ferreting out other dissidents.  Those who were unable 
to escape overseas were often imprisoned or kept under 
constant surveillance.  The immediate crackdown was often 
followed by purges and witch-hunts until the government was 
satisfied that the organization had been crushed.  Through 
each of these events, the government also tried to maintain 
strict control over media sources: newspaper, television, 
and internet.  The government shut down opposing sites and 
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promoted its own propaganda campaigns to discredit the 
dissenters.  Even today the government still relies on 
heavy censure and filters, requiring even foreign companies 
to adhere to Party standards before they are granted a 
contract to operate in the country. 
However, because Tiananmen was first, we can say that 
it did slightly influence the government’s responses to 
later challenges, such as those presented by the China 
Democracy Party and the Falun Gong religious movement.  The 
government learned from Tiananmen to have all its elements 
in place to crush the opposition before it actually acted 
on any one of them.  What we can conclude is that the 
ruling Chinese Communist Party is fearful that any 
organized opposition could become a political focus for the 
widespread hostility and alienation of working people. It 
has crushed all oppositional political, industrial or 
peasant movements as they have emerged.125  While the Party, 
post-Tiananmen, still feared that conceding to the demands 
of groups it did not control would lead to the destruction 
of its political system,126 the Party learned to time its 
actions better so as to avoid historically significant 
anniversaries that might help to catalyze support for the 
opposition and it also learned to avoid occasions covered 
by foreign press. 
In terms of effectiveness, one might argue that the 
CCP has repeatedly demonstrated an inability to act quickly 
and decisively at the onset.  Such hesitation may be 
attributed to internal conflict in the Party regarding the 
threat, or a belief that the movement in question will give 
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up on its own.  Even taking into account the lessons of 
timing, the central government was still slow to oppose the 
China Democracy Party and Falun Gong.  The Party did not 
even attempt to denounce either movement until each had 
already gained considerable momentum and support.   
Similarly, the effectiveness of the crackdowns can 
likewise be questioned.  Although these movements were 
physically crushed and their memberships decimated through 
incarcerations or renouncements, the CCP actually proved 
quite incapable of suppressing them completely.  Tiananmen 
Square dissidents found new voice in the CDP.  And while 
CDP members in China are either in prison or under constant 
surveillance, overseas and exiled supporters remain active.  
Falun Gong also remains very active, having taken its 
battle to the internet.  Practitioners continue to host 
websites, disrupt broadcasts, and stage demonstrations. 
D. SUMMARY 
In summary, the Chinese Communist Party is threatened 
– and recognizes that it is threatened - by any autonomous 
group whose influence and support bridges social 
boundaries, whether these be class, occupation, or region, 
and challenges the Party’s authority of social, political, 
or moral rule.  This has been the case since the Party’s 
founding.  What is more interesting is that the methods of 
social control have not evolved much in the last several 
decades.  The central government is slow to react to 
potential threats, and often indecisive in its initial 
response.  The government has learned to be more aware of 
timing, foreign press, and bloodshed, but the suppression 
techniques remain the same.  Surveillance and intimidation 
give way to mass interrogations, arrests, and forced 
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confessions.  However, the effectiveness of these methods 
is where the CCP will increasingly be tested, since these 
are only superficial, as dissidents increasingly find other 
means around the “strong arm” of the government, whether 
through the internet or asylum or both in combination with 
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